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Abstract 
We study how fragmentation of patent rights (‘patent thickets’) and the formation of the Court of 
Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affected the duration of patent disputes, and thus the speed of 
technology diffusion through licensing. We develop a model of patent litigation which predicts faster 
settlement agreements when patent rights are fragmented and when there is less uncertainty about 
court outcomes, as was associated with the ‘pro-patent shift’ of CAFC. The model also predicts that 
the impact of fragmentation on settlement duration should be smaller under CAFC. We confirm these 
predictions empirically using a dataset that covers nearly all patent suits in U.S. federal district courts 
during the period 1975-2000. Finally, we analyze how fragmentation affects total settlement delay, 
taking into account both reduction in duration per dispute and the increase in the number of required 
patent negotiations associated with patent thickets. 
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The licensing and sale of patents - the ‘market for innovation’ - are an important source of
R&D incentives. Recent studies have shown that transactions in patent rights contribute to
the diﬀusion of technology, and strongly aﬀect the incentives for ﬁrms to undertake innovation
in the ﬁrst place (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Gambardella, Giuri and Luzzi, 2007;
Serrano, 2008). Firms increasingly recognize and exploit the commercial potential of their
patent portfolios through licensing (Rivette and Kline, 2000). To cite one high proﬁle example,
it is reported that IBM earns 958 million from its portfolio. But the market for innovation is not
just important for large ﬁrms. For small ﬁrms patents are often their most important asset, and
the ability to license or sell them eﬀectively is critical to preserving their innovation incentives
and access to venture capital ﬁnance (Mann and Sagel, 2007). Moreover, transactions in patent
rights are important to the development of eﬃcient market structures in high technology sectors.
In biotechnology and other high technology areas, transactions in patent rights strongly shape
the division of labor, and nature of competition, between small ﬁrms who specialize in radical
innovation and larger ﬁrms whose comparative advantage is in the development, production
and marketing of these innovations (Gans and Stern, 2002; Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2003).
One of the diﬃculties in studying transactions in patent rights is the lack of large scale
data sets. As a result, existing studies are typically based on survey information. The only
exception of which we are aware is Serrano (2008), who exploits patent oﬃce information on
changes in the registered ownership to study the sale of patents.
In this paper we study the market for innovation through a new lens — the settlement
of patent infringement disputes. It is common for patents to be licensed as part of settlement
agreements that arise from patent disputes (Anand and Khanna, 2000). An eﬀective market for
innovation requires that such disputes are settled as quickly as possible. Delay and uncertainty
in the settlement and licensing process mean slower diﬀusion of patented technology. Moreover,
longer delays would typically be associated with higher transaction costs for the negotiating
parties. We use comprehensive data on the timing of settlements in patent disputes ﬁled in U.S.
courts to study this issue. As a window on the market for innovation, studying the duration
of patent disputes has both advantages and limitations. First, the speed with which disputes
1are resolved is itself important for innovation, and an indication of how well the market for
innovation works. The second advantage is that we have much more extensive data on patent
settlements than on licensing. In particular, this paper exploits information on essentially
all patent cases ﬁled in U.S. courts over the period 1978-2000. The main limitation of our
empirical strategy is that we do not observe the terms of patent settlements, and thus do not
know whether licensing actually occurred as part of the agreement (or court order).
Licensing negotiations are shaped by characteristics of the patent, the disputants, and the
legal environment. Two key aspects of the patent environment, which have attracted attention
by economists, legal scholars and policy-makers, are the fragmentation of patent rights (often
referred to as ‘patent thickets’) and the establishment of the centralized appellate court for
patents (CAFC) in 1982. Various scholars have claimed that the interplay of fragmentation and
the perceived pro-patent regime under CAFC has increased the complexity of the bargaining
framework and created impediments for innovation (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Eisenberg,
2001; Jaﬀe and Lerner, 2004). The argument is that greater ownership fragmentation generates
higher transaction costs, longer bargaining delays and higher risk of bargaining failures. Despite
the appeal of this argument, the evidence is not particularly supportive. Surveys from the
biomedical industry indicate relatively few cases of substantial bargaining delays or failures in
connection with licensing of research tools and material transfer agreements (Walsh, Arora and
Cohen, 2004; Walsh, Cho and Cohen, 2005).
Recently, Lichtman (2006) challenged the anti-commons view, arguing that the prolifera-
tion of overlapping patent rights may facilitate negotiations and speed up technology diﬀusion.
The idea is that when an innovator needs to secure the use of a variety of patented inputs which
are owned by distinct patentees, the value at stake in each negotiation is lower so each of the
potential licensors has a smaller incentive to litigate. If this happens, ownership fragmentation
can have the eﬀect of speeding up settlement of patent disputes, and promoting rather than
retarding technology diﬀusion and the market for innovation. But even if fragmentation might
have the eﬀect of reducing the settlement delay per dispute, it still might be that the sheer
numbers of patents (required negotiations) associated with patent thickets could cause total
settlement delay to rise.
In this paper we investigate how the fragmentation of patent rights and the introduction
2in 1982 of the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) aﬀected the length of (costly)
patent infringement disputes. We develop a model that focuses on how the uncertainty of
the enforcement regime and ‘upstream’ fragmentation aﬀect ‘downstream’ bargaining behavior
during patent litigation. Our model extends the settlement negotiation game of Bebchuk (1984)
and Spier (1992) by considering features of patent ownership fragmentation similar to those
described in Lerner and Tirole (2004). The model shows that settlement agreements will be
reached more quickly when the patent rights needed by the infringer are more fragmented
(ownership is more dispersed) and in the more ‘certain’ enforcement regime associated with
CAFC.
We test the main predictions of the model using an extended version of the dataset
originally compiled by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a, 2004). This dataset combines infor-
mation about the timing of patent case settlements from U.S. district courts with detailed data
on the litigated patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce. We ﬁnd strong support:
controlling for other characteristics, patent disputes litigated in the U.S. district courts are
settled more quickly when infringers require access to fragmented external rights. We also ﬁnd
that the creation of CAFC substantially reduced settlement delays and, in addition, reduced
the impact of fragmentation on settlement delay (i.e. fragmentation matters less after CAFC).
Moreover, we ﬁnd that CAFC reduced settlement duration more strongly in lower courts that
had the greatest uncertainty of outcomes in the pre-CAFC regime. Finally, we use the pa-
rameter estimates results to study whether fragmentation of patent rights reduced the total
settlement delay, and ﬁnd that this may have occurred in some technology ﬁelds but not in
others. These ﬁndings have important implications for an assessment of the impact of ‘patent
thickets’ on the functioning of the market for innovation and the speed of technology diﬀusion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the predictions that
we empirically test. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in the empirical work.
In Section 4 we present and discuss the econometric results, with particular focus on how
fragmentation of patent rights and CAFC aﬀect the settlement delay per dispute. In Section
5 we use the parameter estimates to explore how the observed changes in fragmentation aﬀect
the total settlement delay, taking into account both the duration per dispute and the number
of disputes. Brief concluding remarks follow.
32 Model
In this section we develop a model to analyze how intellectual property fragmentation aﬀects
settlement bargaining behavior during patent litigation. The model extends the pre-trial ne-
gotiation games of Bebchuk (1984) and Spier (1992) by introducing dispersion of intellectual
property ownership, building on the study of patent pools by Lerner and Tirole (2004). To
simplify the exposition, we focus on a simple two period model. In Appendix 1 we extend the
model to longer time horizons and more general payoﬀ functions.
2.1 Intellectual Property
Consider a technology that builds on a set of features of existing, patented technologies held by
other ﬁrms. Following Lerner and Tirole (2004), we assume for simplicity that these features
are covered by n patents symmetrical in importance and each owned by a diﬀerent patentee.
We refer to these as the ‘constituent patents’. We assume that a licensee obtains a revenue of
V if he uses all n constituent patents. Using only m < n patents, he obtains a revenue equal
to m
n θV. We interpret the parameter θ ∈ [0,n/m] as a measure of the complementarity among
the n constituent patents. If these patents are perfect complements, θ = 0; if they are perfect
substitutes, θ = n/m. The case θ = 1 captures the setting in which the value of the technology
is equally split among the n constituent patents. We interpret the number of required patents,
n, as a measure of the degree of fragmentation of patent rights.
As we show shortly, the case in which a potential user already has access to n−1 patents
will play a crucial role in our analysis. When m = n−1, the value at stake in the nth negotiation
is the diﬀerence between the value earned using all n patents and the value obtained using only
n − 1 of them. We call this this diﬀerence the ‘negotiation value’ and deﬁne it as




Equation (1) allows us to study how the value at stake is aﬀected by both the level of
complementarity among patents and the degree of ownership fragmentation.1 Speciﬁcally, an
increase in the degree of complementarity (lower θ), for constant n, increases the negotiation
1We can also do comparative statics on how the total value of the technology, V, aﬀects the negotiation value.
We do not focus on this aspect because we do not have a satisfactory measure of V in the data.
4value of the nth patent. An increase in the degree of fragmentation, n, for constant θ, reduces
the negotiation value. These eﬀects will play a central role in the predictions of the model.
The expression for the value at stake in equation (1) is similar in spirit to the marginal
willingness to pay for a patent used by Lerner and Tirole (2004) in the context of patent pools.
For simplicity, and to bring out the economic intuition more sharply, we impose linearity of
z(n,θ,V ) in V and θ. In Appendix 1 we show that all our results hold in a more general
framework as long as z(n,θ,V ) is decreasing in n and θ.
2.2 Litigation Game
We study litigation between a patentee and infringer who are both risk neutral. We assume that
the infringer has some private information about factual issues that is relevant to predicting
the expected outcome of the trial. This assumption can be justiﬁed (and microfounded) in
diﬀerent ways. One approach is to assume that the infringer has more knowledge on how the
validity of the patent can be challenged because of prior art not found by the patent oﬃce.
Another possibility is to assume that the infringer knows better what proportion of his product
is covered by the claims in the patent. Using this private information, the defendant estimates
the likelihood that the patentee will prevail at trial, which we denote by p. We refer to such an
infringer as being of type p. The patentee does not know the infringer’s type, but knows that
p is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1].2
The settlement bargaining game proceeds as follows. At time t = 0, the plaintiﬀ makes
a take-it-or-leave it settlement oﬀer to the infringer (i.e., the license payment the infringer
pays to the patentee). If he accepts the oﬀer, the game ends. If the oﬀer is rejected, a trial
takes place at t = 1. Litigation is costly — if a trial takes place, the patentee and infringer
incur costs of Lp and Li, respectively. If the infringer is found liable, the court awards the
patentee damages equal to z(n,θ,V ). This represents the amount the defendant would earn
from successful infringement of this patent, given that he had secured licenses to use the other
n−1 constituent patents. This assumption is consistent with the Unjust Enrichment doctrine,
as described by Schankerman and Schotchmer (2001). Under this doctrine, the patent owner is
entitled to recover the proﬁts realized by the infringer, on the theory that the infringer should
2It is easy to show that Proposition 1 below holds for any distribution F(p) with increasing hazard rate.
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Figure 1: Settlement Bargaining Game
not proﬁt from his wrongdoing.3 Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the game.
2.3 The Impact of Fragmentation
Applying backward induction, we ﬁrst compute the settlement oﬀer that the patentee makes at
t = 0. The settlement (license fee) must be no larger than the sum of his expected damages and
legal costs. Thus, a defendant of type p will accept a settlement S only if S ≤ pz(n,θ,V )+Li,
i.e. p ≥ (S−Li)/z(n,θ,V ). Knowing this, the patentee’s optimization problem is to maximize
his expected proﬁt by choosing a cutoﬀ type, p∗, such that infringers above this cutoﬀ accept





[pz(n,θ,V ) + Li]dy +
￿ p
0
[yz(n,θ,V ) − Lp]dy
subject to the constraint p ∈ [0,1]. The ﬁrst integral is the expected settlement value, and the
second is expected damages net of the patentee’s litigation cost. Deﬁning L ≡ Li + Lp, the
unconstrained ﬁrst order condition yields the following optimal cutoﬀ type:4
3Lost Royalty is the alternative liability rule used in the U.S.. Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) point out
that the lost royalty doctrine involves a “circularity” between damages and licensing fee. From a technical point
of view, this circularity generates a large number of equilibria. If we compute the average level of damages across
the set of possible equilibria, one can show that average damages increase linearly in θ and decrease in n. In
this sense, our framework is consistent with the lost royalty doctrine as well.
4Because of the uniform distribution of p, the expected win rate is p
∗/2 that for high litigation costs can be
arbitrarily close to zero. In a more general model, the win rate will depend on z, L and the distribution of p
and will be equal to the average probability among defendant types lower than p
∗. In principle it possible to
generate parameter values that match any empirical win rate.




In a two period model, because all types with p < p∗ reject the settlement, the uniform
distribution over types implies that the expected length of a dispute is equal to the optimal
cut-oﬀ:




This allows us to summarize the relationship between fragmentation, complementarity
and the expected settlement time in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The expected settlement time, E(t∗), is non-increasing in n and θ.
P roof. Using equations (1) and (2), it follows immediately that ∂E(t∗)/∂n ≤ 0 and
∂E(t∗)/∂θ ≤ 0.
This proposition describes two properties of the expected settlement time in equilibrium.
First, fragmentation (large n) tends to reduce bargaining delay in each dispute. The intuition
is that, provided the n patents are not perfect complements (θ ￿= 0), fragmentation reduces
the negotiation value and hence the patentee’s marginal beneﬁt of screening, making early
agreement more likely. Second, stronger complementarity among the required patents increases
the expected settlement time per dispute. When patents are highly complementary, the surplus
that the patentee expects to extract by litigating and holding-up the alleged infringer is larger.
This increases expected damages, making early agreement less attractive. Therefore, for a
given θ, an increase in n tends to reduce delay; similarly, for a given n, an increase in θ tends
to reduce the expected delay.5
To summarize, Proposition 1 delivers two testable predictions about the relationship
between the settlement delay per dispute and the degree of fragmentation and complementarity:
H1: Settlement negotiations will be shorter when the infringer requires access to more
fragmented patent rights.
5It is easy to show that the results in this Section also hold under the following extensions: 1) allowing
parties to incur settlement costs in period zero, and 2) allowing the patentee and/or infringer’s litigation costs
to increase with the negotiation value (potential damages) — Lp(z) and Li(z) — provided that the elasticity of
total litigation costs with respect z is less than one.
7H2: Settlement negotiations will be longer for patents that have fewer substitutes (i.e.,
greater complementarity).
2.4 The Impact of CAFC
The Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was established in 1982 to unify patent
doctrine and to bring greater uniformity and predictability to patent decisions.6 Many scholars
have argued that CAFC generated a distinct ‘pro-patent’ shift (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Jaﬀe
and Lerner, 2004). This took the form of tougher evidentiary standards to invalidate patents
(Allison and Lemley, 1998; Henry and Turner, 2006), and increased likelihood of large damage
awards (Merges, 1997). We study the impact of CAFC’s on district court decisions. We would
expect the pro-patent shift at the appellate court level to aﬀect lower court decisions, since
there is a reputational cost to lower court judges if they are reversed on appeal (Songer, Segal
and Cameron, 1994; Klein and Hume, 2003).
In this section we examine how this pro-patent shift altered the bargaining framework
for disputes litigated after 1982. A natural way to introduce this pro-patent shift is to assume
that CAFC induced a stochastically dominant shift in the distribution of damages for the
patentee. But this is not adequate because it does not capture the widely held view that
patent decisions became more predictable after CAFC (ﬁrst order stochastic dominance does
not imply a reduction in variance). For ease of exposition, in this section we present an
extremely simple speciﬁcation that embodies stochastic dominance and a reduction in variance
in outcomes. In Appendix 2 we show that our results are robust to more complex speciﬁcations.
We assume that there are two types of district courts. A proportion of them (α) are
‘biased’ in the sense that they always award full damages, z(n,θ,V ), to the patentee indepen-
dently of infringer’s type p. The remaining fraction (1−α) are ‘unbiased’ in the sense that they
correctly assess whether the infringement took place, i.e., the probability p. We also assume
that the parties to the dispute know which type of district court is adjudicating their dispute.
In this simple setting, it is straightforward to compute the expected settlement delay
(averaged across courts). If the court is not biased, the bargaining game is identical to the
6Gallini (2002) documents how proponents of CAFC stressed the importance of predictability in enforcing
patent rights in promoting R&D investment.
8one studied in the previous section and the expected settlement time is E(t∗). If the court is
biased, there is no asymmetric information and the two parties settle immediately. Thus the
expected settlement time, averaged across courts, is
E(tB) = (1 − α)E(t∗). (3)
Proposition 2 The expected settlement time in the presence of court bias, E(tB), is decreasing




P roof. It follows immediately from (3) and the fact that ∂E(t∗)/∂n ≤ 0.
The fact that E(tB) is decreasing in α suggests that the pro-patent bias associated with
the introduction of CAFC facilitated early settlement agreements. The intuition is that pro-
patent bias reduces the uncertainty about damage awards and thus diminishes the impact of
asymmetric information on the bargaining process. It is interesting to note that it is not the
direction of bias that aﬀects settlement delay in our model, but the reduced uncertainty that
bias entails. Any bias would reduce settlement delay as long as it reduces the variance of the
distribution of damages.7 What the direction of the bias (pro-patent, in our model) does is
to aﬀect the terms of the settlement agreement, increasing the patentee’s expected payoﬀ.8
In the context of cumulative innovation, the settlement terms are important because they
determine the structure of innovation incentives for initial and follow-on invention, as Green
and Scotchmer (1995) and Scotchmer (1996) have shown. In this paper we do not take a
normative position on court bias (either pro- or anti-patent). We study only how such bias
aﬀects bargaining delay and thus technology diﬀusion.
The second part of Proposition 2 says that when there is less uncertainty about the
outcome of the trial, the impact of the negotiation value (fragmentation reduces this value) on
the likelihood of reaching a settlement agreement is reduced. To highlight intuition, consider
the extreme case in which courts always award the patentee damages. In this case, all disputes
will be settled immediately, independently of the level of fragmentation.
7Consider the case of ‘anti-patent bias’ where a fraction α of courts always award zero damages, independently
of infringer type. Again there is no asymmetric information for biased courts, so parties settle immediately, and
average settlement time is again E(t
B) = (1 − α)E(t
∗).






∗Lp. It is straightforward to show that the patentee’s
equilibrium payoﬀ is (1 − α)π(p
∗) + αz when there is pro-patent bias, and (1 − α)π(p
∗) with anti-patent bias.
9Proposition 2 provides two additional testable predictions about settlement delay:
H3: Settlement negotiations will be shorter for cases ﬁled after the introduction of
CAFC;
H4: The impact of fragmented external rights will be lower after the introduction of
CAFC.
2.5 Heterogeneity in Uncertainty across Circuit Courts
Before the establishment of CAFC, there were sharp diﬀerences across circuit court jurisdic-
tions in their enforcement of patent rights. Henry and Turner (2006) document substantial
heterogeneity in the frequency of validity and infringement ﬁndings, both across circuit courts
of appeal and across district courts within any given circuit. These diﬀerences suggest that the
impact of CAFC may have varied across circuit court jurisdictions, depending on the level of
pre-CAFC uncertainty.
To address this issue, we extend our model by assuming that in each circuit the likelihood
that the patentee will prevail at trial is uniformly distributed over the interval
￿1
2(1 − λ), 1
2(1 + λ)
￿
with λ ∈ [0,1]. An increase in λ enlarges the variance of the distribution while preserving its
mean.9 We interpret the parameter λ as a measure of the level of pre-CAFC uncertainty in
court outcomes (including appeals), and we conduct comparative statics in λ to study the
diﬀerential impact of CAFC across circuits.










which implies an expected settlement time equal to




After CAFC the expected settlement time is
E(tB) = (1 − α)E(t∗(λ)). (5)
9Bebchuk (1984) shows that the results in this section are valid for more general (non-uniform) mean-
preserving shifts.




P roof. It follows immediately from formulas (4) and (5).
As ﬁrst pointed out by Bebchuk (1984), "spreading out" the distribution of types in-
creases the expected settlement time because it ampliﬁes the diﬀerences among types in the
expected outcome of a trial. Moreover, the proposition implies that the impact of CAFC is
larger in circuits where the variance of p is greater and suggests the following testable prediction.
H5: The impact of CAFC is stronger in circuits where there is larger uncertainty in
court outcomes in the pre-CAFC regime.
3 Description of Data
The empirical work is based on two data sets: patent litigation data from the U.S. federal
district courts, and the NBER patent dataset. The patent litigation dataset was compiled by
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a, 2004). This dataset matches litigated patents identiﬁed
from the Lit-Alert database with information on the progress or resolution of suits from the
court database organized by the Federal Judicial Center. The dataset contains 9,219 patent
infringement cases ﬁled during the period 1975-2000 and terminated before 2001. For each
of these case ﬁlings, the dataset reports detailed information on the main patent litigated
(although there may be other patents listed), the patentee, the infringer and the court dealing
with the case. Following Lanjouw and Schankerman, we focus on the main patent in dispute
(when multiple patents are listed).
We extended the Lanjouw and Schankerman dataset by collecting information on the
identity of the infringers. We manually matched infringer names listed in the court data with
assignee names in the NBER patent dataset. We were able to match the infringer to a patent
assignee for 5,131 infringement cases. In most cases where matching was not possible, the
names of the infringers suggest they were individuals or small ﬁrms. This matching procedure
allows us to identify the patents owned by the infringing parties, and thus to construct the size
of their patent portfolios and other information at the time of litigation. In this respect, our
data is more comprehensive than those used in earlier studies, where information on infringers
11was not present (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001a, 2004; Simcoe et al., 2008) or was limited
to speciﬁc industries (e.g. semiconductors in Hall and Ziedonis, 2007; drugs and computers in
Somaya, 2003).
The main variables used in the empirical analysis are described below.
Dispute Duration: This is the endogenous variable in the analysis. It is deﬁned as
the number of months elapsed between the original case ﬁling date and the case termination
date, as reported in the district court data. This variable indicates the time period required
to reach the settlement agreement or, in its absence, the court judgment. On average, it takes
18 months and 18 days to settle a patent litigation case. However, the distribution of length
is sharply skewed (Figure 1): 25 percent of cases settle within 5 months, but 25 percent last
more than 24 months.
We use the following control variables to capture the main ingredients of our bargaining
model.
Fragmentation1: Let pτT denote a patent in technology class τ which is litigated at
time T, and let j denote the infringer (we use the 36 two digits categories as deﬁned in Hall,
Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg, 2001). We identify the set of the infringer’s patents in class τ with
application year within ﬁve years in either direction of the suit, say {pjτt}T−5≤t≤T+5. We then
identify the share of citations of these patents in each of the 417 classes deﬁned by the USPTO,
and compute the fraction of citations to patents belonging to class n, wjnT. For each class
we compute the share of patents accounted for by the top four patentees in the same 10-year
window, C4nT. Using this information we construct the following fragmentation measure:




For 25 percent of the infringers in the sample, we do not observe any patent in the
technology class of the litigated patent with application year in a ten year window around the
suit (this is because they are very small, not missing information). For these infringers, following
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), we calculate a concentration index using the citations of
the litigated patent as weights for the fragmentation measure. A dummy variable, Missing, is
set equal to one for observations for which this correction was performed.
As a robustness check we construct an alternative measure:
12Fragmentation2: As in the previous measure, we construct the set {pjτt}T−5≤t≤T+5.
We then identify the citations of these patents that refer to other (distinct) assignees. Let Ckj
denote the number of these citations that refers to assignee k. Following Ziedonis (2004), we














where Cj indicates the total number of non-self, backward citations.10
Both fragmentation measures attempt to capture the degree of concentration of patent
rights. The idea is that when a ﬁrm’s patents are related to technology areas with few paten-
tees, that ﬁrm is more likely to be involved in a smaller number of negotiations and disputes
(Ziedonis, 2004; Noel and Schankerman, 2006). The two measures diﬀer in the way they iden-
tify the technology areas in which the ﬁrms obtain their patented inputs. Fragmentation1 uses
the infringer’s backward citations to identify these technology classes. Fragmentation2 uses the
patentees actually cited as a proxy for the number of required negotiations.11,12
Our data contains a substantial minority of infringers with very small patent portfolios
(e.g., 50 percent have fewer than four patents in the technology area in a ten year window).
For these cases we considered it more sensible to infer the degree of fragmentation from the
entities operating in their technology area rather than from the entities cited. For this reason,
we use Fragmentation1 as primary measure of ownership dispersion, and Fragmentation2 as a
robustness check on the results.
Complementarity: Let pτt denote a litigated patent with application year t and be-
longing to the technology class τ (we use the 36 two digits categories as deﬁned in Hall, Jaﬀe
and Trajtenberg, 2001). Our complementarity measure is the ratio between the non-self ci-
10As recommended by Hall (2002), we use the term Cj/(Cj−1) to remove the downward bias of the Herﬁndahl
index.
11To see the diﬀerence, consider the case in which all backward citations of a ﬁrm go to a single patentee that
operates in a technology area in which ownership is very fragmented. In this case Fragmentation1 will indicate
the infringer as operating in a very fragmented area, whereas Fragmentation2 will show that the infringer deals
with only one patentee
12We also constructed a third measure of fragmentation using the distribution of the infringer’s patents across
classes, rather than the infringer’s patent citations, to identify the technology areas in which the ﬁrm obtains
its inputs. This measure is highly correlated with Fragmentation1 and the econometric results are very similar
with this measure.
13tations that pτt has received up to the year 2002 from patents in technology class τ and the
non-self citations received by all patents in τ that have application dates in a 10 year window
from the application of the litigated patent. Formally, let Cτ
pτt denote the number of non-self









In the analysis that follows, we multiply this index by 1000. With this normalization, Comple-
mentarity=α means that the citations received by the litigated patent account for α percent
of the citations received by patents in a one-year window in the technology ﬁeld.
This measure is indirect and imperfect. Ideally, we would like to measure complementar-
ity more directly, but this would require detailed information about the actual set of patented
inputs used by each ﬁrm in the sample. The number of citations received by a patent has been
widely used as a indicator of ‘importance’ of a patent. Our complementarity measure reﬂects
the importance of the litigated patent relative to other patents in the same technology ﬁeld.
This measure is based on the idea that the greater is the relative importance of the patent, the
more diﬃcult is for the infringer to ﬁnd a substitute patented input in that technology ﬁeld.
Thus we associate a higher value of the measure with a lower value of the parameter θ in the
model.
Patent value: We use the number of total (self and non-self) citations received by
the litigated patent from patents in all technology ﬁelds (up to the year 2002) as a measure
of the value of the litigated patent. This measure is conceptually and empirically distinct
from the complementarity index, which measures the relative importance of the patent in
its own technology ﬁeld. The sample correlation between our measures of patent value and
complementarity is only 0.16.
CAFC: We construct a dummy variable for patent suits ﬁled after the creation of the
specialized patent appellate court, which was introduced in 1982. The dummy takes value of
one for cases ﬁled from 1982 onwards. We experimented with alternative timings (to reﬂect
lags in the eﬀects of CAFC) but the empirical results were very similar.
High-Variance Circuits: We use information on district court decisions and circuit
14court appeals for the period 1953-1981 (Henry and Turner, 2006) to construct a dummy variable
for cases litigated in the top three (alternatively, four) circuits with greatest uncertainty about
court outcomes. We treat the court decision as a Bernoulli process. Let p denote the probability
that the patentee ‘wins’ in a given district court. Then the variance on outcomes for that court
is given by p(1 − p). We use two alternative deﬁnitions of a ‘win’: i) the fraction of cases
where the district court ﬁnds the patent “valid and infringed” and ii) this fraction adjusted by
the observed rates of appeal and circuit court aﬃrmation of the pro-patent decision.13 Both
approaches identify the same top four circuits in terms of variance: the 4th, 5th, 7th and 10th
circuits.
Duplicate cases: In the data we observe distinct patent suits that involve the same
patentee, the same infringer and the same patent and which are recorded in the same year.
Sometimes these cases have been re-entered with the same docket number, sometimes with a
diﬀerent one. Part of this re-entry appears to be associated with a change in the litigation
venue. We generated a dummy variable to control for these “duplicate” cases.
Technology ﬁeld dummies: Following Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), we control
for the technology ﬁeld of the litigated patents. We use eight broad technology areas (percent
of sample): Pharmaceuticals (3.8%), Other Health (8.8%), Chemicals (14.4%), Electronics
excluding computers (21.3%), Mechanical (30.9%), Computers (1.0%), Biotechnology (0.7%),
and Miscellaneous (19.1%).
District court dummies: We use a complete set of dummy variables to control for
the district of the court in which the patent is litigated. There are 89 district courts in the 50
states and all of them are represented in our sample.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables.
In Table 2 we examine the key predictions of the bargaining model using the raw data.
The top panel shows that the dispute duration is negatively related to fragmentation. For the
entire sample period, the mean dispute duration for patents with fragmentation index above the
median is about 10 percent lower than for those below the median. The diﬀerence is larger for
13Speciﬁcally, let q denote the probability that the patent is held “valid and infringed,” r be the probability
the decision is appealed, and ω denote the probability the lower court decision is aﬃrmed. Under the second
method, the patentee win rate is given by p = q(1 − r) + qrω + (1 − q)r(1 − ω).
15cases ﬁled before the formation of CAFC, consistent with the prediction that fragmentation is
less important when there is less uncertainty over court outcomes. The lower panel of the table
shows that dispute duration is positively related to complementarity. For the whole sample
period, the mean dispute duration for patents with complementarity index above the median is
about 40 percent longer than for those below the median.14 This table also shows that there is
a sharp drop in the mean dispute duration for cases ﬁled in district courts after the formation
of CAFC.
These simple mean comparisons are conﬁrmed by the sample distributions of dispute
durations (survival curves) in Figure 2. The distribution for patents with below-median frag-
mentation stochastically dominates the one for above-median fragmentation (the reverse holds
for complementarity; ﬁgures omitted for brevity). In addition, the distribution of dispute
duration for cases ﬁled before CAFC stochastically dominates the one for cases after CAFC.
In Table 3 we show that the reduction in dispute duration is associated with a decline
in the fraction of cases reaching ﬁnal adjudication at trial. Prior to the introduction of CAFC,
17.2 percent of all patent suits reached ﬁnal adjudication, as compared to only 5.9 percent
afterwards. As the table shows, this reduction occurred in all technology ﬁelds. This is exactly
what we would expect since CAFC increased the likelihood of the patentee prevailing on appeal,
and thus reduced the incentive for the alleged infringer to hold out (at great cost) for a lower
court decision.15 At the same time, the number of patent suits per year increased dramatically
as well — from about 185 before CAFC to 550 in the period 1983-94. These facts suggest that
the observed reduction in dispute duration is due to earlier settlements and not to an increase
in the rapidity of court decisions.
In the next section we examine whether these conclusions are conﬁrmed by formal econo-
metric analysis.
14We also ﬁnd that dispute duration is longer for more valuable patents (not shown in the table). The mean
duration for cases in the fourth quartile of the distribution of patent citations is about 30 percent longer than
for those in the ﬁrst quartile.
15We also ﬁnd that there was a substantial increase in the number of cases settled very early, before the
pre-trial hearing is reached.
164 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Results
4.1 Econometric Speciﬁcation
To study the data on the duration of disputes, we adopt a proportional hazard model with an
exponential speciﬁcation:
lnhijct = α0 + α1Fragmentationijt + α2Complementarityit + (9)
α3CAFCt + α4CAFCt ∗ Fragmentationijt + α5Xit + ωc + ηt + εijct
where h denotes the (age-constant) hazard rate, i,j,c and t represent the patent being sued, the
infringing ﬁrm, the district court hearing the case, and the year the suit is ﬁled, respectively,
X is a vector of control variables for other factors that aﬀect bargaining delay (including
patent value), ωc represents a full set of court dummy variables, ηt is a partial set of year
dummies (explained below), and εijct is a mean zero random error. For the baseline results,
we assume that εijct is independent over i,j,c and t. However, we also discuss how standard
errors change when we allow for clustering across patents and patent owners.16 A negative
coeﬃcient on a regressor in the hazard rate model means that the variable makes it less likely
that negotiations end, which corresponds to a longer expected settlement delay. The model
implies the following predictions in this speciﬁcation: fragmentation reduces bargaining delay
(α1 > 0), complementarity increases delay (α2 < 0), CAFC reduces delay (α3 > 0) and also
reduces the impact of fragmentation on delay in absolute value (α4 < 0). The exponential
speciﬁcation imposes a constant (baseline) hazard rate, but the results are nearly identical for
the more ﬂexible Weibull speciﬁcation which allows for an age-dependent hazard rate (Kiefer,
1988).17
The baseline speciﬁcation embodies two sets of restrictions that should be noted. First,
16Such correlation can arise from two sources. First, there are instances in the data of multiple cases involving
the same patent, so any unobserved heterogeneity at the patent level would induce correlation. Second, there
are instances of the same plaintiﬀ (patentee) involved in multiple suits over diﬀerent patents, so unobserved
heterogeneity at the patentee level can also induce correlation across patents (e.g. some ﬁrms are more aggressive
than others in enforcing their patent rights). Thus we also compute robust standard errors with clustering at
the patent, or patentee (plaintiﬀ), level.
17The Weibull is a two-parameter distribution with the (baseline) hazard function h(t) = λγt
γ−1.The expo-
nential case arises when γ = 1. In the baseline econometric speciﬁcation, the point estimate of γ is 1.28 (s.e. =
0.013), so we formally reject the exponential restriction in favor of the Weibull with an increasing hazard rate.
17most of the variation over time in settlement delays is captured through the CAFC dummy
variable (equal to one for t ≥ 1982). This is a constrained version of a more general speciﬁ-
cation which allows for an unrestricted set of year dummies for 1976-2000, say {ηt}, and their
interactions with the fragmentation measure, Fragmentation ∗ {ηt}. We began by estimating
this unrestricted speciﬁcation — Figure 3 plots the estimated year eﬀects (normalized to zero in
1975). They show no trend during 1976-81, a sharp drop in 1982, which was when CAFC was es-
tablished. We do not reject the joint hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the dummies are zero for
1976-1981 and equal to each other for 1982-1991 (p-value= 0.08). We therefore introduced the
additive CAFC dummy and allowed year dummies only for 1992-2000.18 We then tested, and
do not reject, the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms Fragmentation∗{ηt}
are zero for 1976-1981 and equal to each other for 1982-2000 (p-value= 0.08). This provides
support for our baseline speciﬁcation, where year dummies ηt are included only for 1992-2000.
Second, the baseline speciﬁcation assumes that the coeﬃcients on the fragmentation
measure and its interaction with the CAFC dummy are the same across technology ﬁelds.
We tested these restrictions using six broad technology categories and do not reject them (p-
value= 0.17).
Before turning to results, two additional points should be noted. First, the key deter-
minants of bargaining delay in our model — fragmentation and complementarity — are diﬃcult
to measure, and the constructs we use are likely to contain random measurement error. The
associated attenuation bias will cause us to underestimate the impact of fragmentation and
complementarity on expected settlement duration, so our estimates are conservative in this
sense.
The ﬁnal point involves sample selection. We observe disputes if a suit is ﬁled but not
if they are settled before that stage. Since negotiations occur in the shadow of litigation, the
pro-patent bias of CAFC should have facilitated greater pre-suit settlement of the ‘easier’ cases.
This selection implies that the cases we observe after the introduction of CAFC will tend to
be those with longer dispute duration. On this account our estimates will underestimate the
18These free dummies are needed because there is a distinct decline in average settlement delay after 1997),
which is partly due to truncation in the data (we only observe cases that have been settled by 2000). We
decisively reject the hypothesis that these free dummies are jointly zero.
18true (negative) impact of CAFC on settlement delay.
4.2 Empirical Results
Table 4 reports the baseline parameter estimates for the hazard model, together with the
implied marginal eﬀects of each control variable on the expected dispute duration.19 In column
(1) we include only the three key variables — Fragmentation, Complementarity and CAFC — and
the year dummies for 1992-2000. The results are consistent with the predictions of the model.
First, the estimated coeﬃcient on fragmentation (α1) is positive and signiﬁcant, conﬁrming
hypothesis H1: when infringers require access to more fragmented patent rights, disputes are
settled faster (higher hazard rate). A one standard deviation increase in the fragmentation
index reduces dispute duration by 22 days. Second, stronger complementarity among patents
increases the duration of disputes (reduces hazard rate), supporting hypothesis H2. The point
estimate of α2 is negative and signiﬁcant, and implies that a one standard deviation increase in
the complementarity index increases duration by 23 days. Third, the duration of disputes was
sharply reduced by the establishment of the specialized appellate court, CAFC. The positive
and signiﬁcant point estimate of α3 implies that CAFC reduced the average settlement delay by
6 months. This ﬁnding supports the hypothesis that the pro-patent bias associated with CAFC
reduced the uncertainty over litigation outcomes and damages, thereby facilitating settlement.
In columns (2)-(4) we incrementally add control variables. Column 2 includes technology
ﬁeld and district court ﬁxed eﬀects. In this speciﬁcation the estimated impact of fragmentation
is 30 percent larger than without ﬁxed eﬀects. There is almost no change in the estimates
for complementarity and CAFC. Not surprisingly, the court ﬁxed eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant
(we reject the null that they are zero, p-value < 0.01). This is consistent with studies by legal
scholars which show that there is substantial variation in the degree to which federal district
courts seem to favor patent holders (Moore, 2001).20
19Two points should be noted. First, for all these regressions we present heteroskedaticity-robust standard
errors. We also allowed for clustering at the patentee level and at the patent level (for cases where there are
multiple suits on the same patent). The clustered standard errors are very similar, and statistical signiﬁcance is
unaﬀected.
Second, we obtain very similar estimated marginal eﬀects and signiﬁcance levels if we use a simple linear
speciﬁcation estimated by ordinary least squares.
20Given this variation, there is the possibility that the disputants may ‘venue-shop’ for courts sympathetic to
19Column (3) adds a control for patent value (citations count) and dummy variables to
account for cases where there are duplicate disputes and for (small) infringers for whom we
were unable to compute the fragmentation index. The estimated coeﬃcients on Fragmenta-
tion, Complementarity and CAFC are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls. As
expected, we ﬁnd that negotiations over more valuable patents take longer to settle. A one
standard deviation increase in the citations count extends dispute duration by 0.78 months.
However, as we show in the next Section, this estimate corresponds to patents of an ‘average’
age. Taken together with the ﬁnding by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001a, 2004) that more
valuable patents are much more likely to be involved in litigation in the ﬁrst place, we conclude
that patent enforcement and licensing are most problematic precisely for the patents that mat-
ter most. Moreover, our ﬁnding that both patent value and complementarity independently
aﬀect dispute duration suggests that our measure of complementarity is not just a proxy for
value. Finally, the estimated coeﬃcients on the dummy variables for duplicate and missing
cases (involving very small infringers) are statistically signiﬁcant. Duplicate cases take much
longer to settle (13 months), which is not surprising since they are likely to be more complex.
Interestingly, the Missing dummy indicates that cases that involve very small infringers (who
have no patents in the same technology subclass as the infringed patent) settle faster, by about
1.1 months.
The model predicts that the reduction of uncertainty associated with the ‘pro-patent
bias’ of the centralized appellate court should reduce the impact of fragmentation on dispute
duration. In column (4) we introduce the interaction between Fragmentation and the CAFC
dummy to test this prediction. We treat this as the baseline speciﬁcation. The estimated coef-
ﬁcient on the interaction term is statistically signiﬁcant and strongly conﬁrms this prediction.
The marginal eﬀect of fragmentation prior to CAFC is -55.4, but after CAFC it drops to -7.2,
and we reject that it is equal to zero (p-value = 0.03). Allowing for the interaction increases
our estimate of the impact of CAFC on dispute duration. The net eﬀect of CAFC, evaluated
their position, to the extent this is allowed by law. If this occurs and both parties are aware of court ‘bias’,
this should facilitate earlier settlement. However, there is no reason to believe that venue shopping should be
correlated with our measures of fragmentation or complementarity, and thus it should not introduce any bias
in the estimated coeﬃcients on these variables. If the extent of venue-shopping changed at all after CAFC, we
would expect it to have declined since there is less uncertainty about the outcome on appeal. Thus our estimate
of the impact of CAFC on dispute duration should be conservative.
20at the mean value of fragmentation, is to reduce dispute duration by 7.8 months. This is larger
than the estimate for column (3) where we do not allow for the interaction (reduction of 5.3
months). Interestingly, in our baseline regression, we ﬁnd no strong evidence that settlement
delay varies across technology ﬁelds (we do not reject at 5-percent that the technology ﬁxed
eﬀects are zero, p-value= 0.09).21
As discussed earlier, there was substantial heterogeneity across circuits in the uncertainty
of court outcomes before CAFC. The model predicts that the eﬀect of introducing CAFC should
be stronger for district courts located in circuits where the uncertainty over damages was larger.
To test this prediction, in column (5) we introduce an interaction between the dummy variable
for CAFC and a dummy variable for the top 3 circuit courts with the highest variance in
outcomes. This is exactly what we ﬁnd: the estimated impact of CAFC is almost twice as
large for the high-variance district courts. This ﬁnding gives us additional conﬁdence that the
CAFC eﬀect is not simply due to some unobserved factor that reduced settlement duration,
since we ﬁnd that the reduction is systematically related to the degree of pre-CAFC variance
in court outcomes.
All of the preceding speciﬁcations include a full set of (additive) district court dummies.
There are many reasons district courts might diﬀer in their average settlement durations,
including case loads and ﬁscal constraints. But the model predicts one factor that should play
a role is the degree of uncertainty over court outcomes. This should not only interact with
the impact of CAFC, as discussed above, but also should aﬀect settlement duration in the
pre-CAFC regime. To examine this hypothesis, in column (6) we replace the district court
dummies with a single dummy variable for the high-variance circuit courts. We expect the
estimated marginal eﬀect of this dummy variable to be positive, and that is what we ﬁnd. The
point estimate implies that settlement negotiations in these high variance circuits lasted four
months longer than in other circuits. At the same time, we reject the restrictions imposed
by this more parsimonious speciﬁcation (p-value<0.001). This is not surprising, and simply
conﬁrms that there are other factors accounting for variation across district courts. But it is
21Bulow (2004) points out peculiar settlement agreements that are sometimes observed in pharmaceutical
patent infringements. As a robustness check, we dropped cases involving pharmaceutical patents and found that
the estimated parameters were similar to the baseline results.
21interesting to note that the estimated coeﬃcients on the other variables are very similar in the
more restricted speciﬁcation (compare columns (5) and (6)), which indicates that these other
factors are evidently not correlated with the variables of interest in the model.
4.3 Extensions and Robustness
In this section we examine extensions and robustness of the baseline speciﬁcation (Table 5).
The ﬁrst experiment involves a generalization of the way in which patent value aﬀects
dispute duration. We have controlled for the value of the patent using a citations measure.
However, the stakes in the negotiation (potential licensing value), and thus the expected dispute
duration, should also depend on the age of the patent for two reasons: ﬁrst, there is age-related
depreciation in the private returns from patented innovations (Schankerman, 1998) and, second,
there is less time remaining until statutory expiration of the patent. To capture both eﬀects,
we write patent value at age a as Va = V e−δa ￿ V (1 − δa). Assuming the true speciﬁcation of
the model involves Va, if we include both V (citations) and an interaction term V ∗ a in the
regression, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term should be negative and the ratio between the
coeﬃcients yields an estimate of δ. The results in column (1), Table 5 conﬁrm that the dispute
duration is smaller for older patents, controlling for their citations count. Moreover, the point
estimates show that, for young patents, the impact of value is about two times larger than
when we do not incorporate the age eﬀect (column (4), Table 4). For new patents (a = 0),
marginal eﬀect of value is 0.056, and a one standard deviation increase in value raises dispute
duration by 1.4 months. Moreover, the implied estimate of δ is 0.054, implying the impact of
value on dispute duration disappears after about 20 years.
Second, there is a concern that our results might be driven by serial litigants, either
patentees or infringers involved in multiple disputes. In our sample there are 2,931 distinct
patentees, with a mean number of disputes per patentee of 1.53 (median=1, maximum=19).
The distribution is highly skewed - the top 1 percent of patentees account for 5.63 percent of
disputes. The numbers are almost identical for the distribution of infringers. We take two
approaches to address this concern. First, we include dummy variables for serial patentees
and infringers (the top 1 percent) and re-estimate the baseline speciﬁcation (column (2) in
22Table 5).22 Second, we simply drop cases involving the serial patentees or infringers (reducing
the sample size by 8 percent). In both approaches the estimated parameters are similar to
the baseline results. The coeﬃcient on the dummy variables are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level and, interestingly, suggest that the disputes take longer to settle (nearly 4 months) when
brought by a serial patentee, but are settled more quickly (3.5 months) when a serial infringer is
involved. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that serial patentees are those who aggressively
enforce their intellectual property, and serial infringers are those who only engage in licensing
negotiations when forced to do so by patent suits.
Third, we examined whether the size of the litigants’ patent portfolios aﬀected their
ability to settle disputes. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) show that ﬁrms with larger patent
portfolios are much less likely to be involved in patent suits, indicating that portfolios provide
bargaining chits and facilitate tacit cooperation in settling disputes without recourse to courts.
One might think that a similar mechanism operates for settling disputes after suits are ﬁled.
To study this, and to check robustness of our key ﬁndings to this extension, we included
measures of the patent portfolios (cumulated patents over the preceding 20 years) held by the
patentee and infringer, as well as the relative portfolio size. We found no signiﬁcant impact
for these portfolio measures (not reported). However, we do ﬁnd evidence that symmetry in
portfolio sizes matter at the extremes of the size distribution (column (3), Table 5). Disputes
are signiﬁcantly shorter when both litigants have either very large patent portfolios (≥1000
patents) or very small portfolios (≤ 5 patents). For large ﬁrm pairings, the dispute duration
is shorter by 4.4 months; for small ﬁrm pairings, by 1.3 months. The ﬁnding for large ﬁrms is
consistent with the interpretation of Lanjouw and Schankerman, while the small ﬁrm ﬁnding
suggests a role for cash constraints in the settlement process. However, we leave a more careful
study of this topic for future research.
Fourth, as we discussed in Section 3, there is a potential truncation problem for cases not
terminated before 2000. To address this concern we re-estimate our baseline regression using
only cases ﬁled before 1994 (fewer than 4 percent of cases last more than 5 years). This reduces
the sample by 24.2 percent. Nonetheless, the results from this restricted sample (column (4),
22We also tried including a dummy for cases involving both serial patentee and infringers but the coeﬃcient
was not statistically signiﬁcant (p − value = 0.11).
23Table 5) are very similar to those for the full sample.
Fifth, the measure we use for patent value is the total citation count (including self-
cites) received by the litigated patent. Unfortunately, for 29 percent oﬀ the litigated patents
the NBER database does not allow us to distinguish between self-and non-self citations received.
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the baseline speciﬁcation using only non-self citations
when available and total cites for the other 29 percent, and introducing an additive dummy for
the latter. The parameter estimates are nearly identical to the baseline results (not reported,
for brevity).23
Sixth, column (5) presents the baseline speciﬁcation using the alternative, Fragmentation2,
measure. The qualitative ﬁndings are the same, but the impacts of fragmentation and CAFC
are somewhat smaller. The point estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in
Fragmentation2 reduces dispute duration before CAFC by 1.8 months, as compared to about
3.9 in the baseline speciﬁcation. There is no statistically signiﬁcant impact post-CAFC (p-value
= 0.34), whereas in the baseline speciﬁcation there was a small, but statistically signiﬁcant,
negative impact. Finally, the estimated impact of CAFC, evaluated at the mean fragmentation,
is -7 months, very similar to the estimate in column (4) of Table 4.
Lastly, we consider the potential endogeneity of the fragmentation measure which might
partially account for the negative relationship between fragmentation and settlement duration
which we observe. There may be unobserved factors — in particular, transactional and tech-
nological complexity — that aﬀect both the ability of ﬁrms to negotiate technology transfer
agreements and the concentration of ownership of patent rights. When these factors are impor-
tant, ﬁrms may choose to integrate into complementary technology areas in order to internalize
these diﬃcult transactions. In this case, ﬁelds with more concentrated ownership would ex-
hibit longer settlement durations. It is diﬃcult to think of suitable instrumental variables for
fragmentation, so we address this concern in a diﬀerent way. If fragmentation is simply a re-
23As explained in Section 3, for about 25 percent of cases the infringer has no patents in the technology
sub-class of the litigated patent (within a 5 year window). For these cases, to construct the fragmentation
measure we use the citations of the litigated patent. In the baseline estimation, we included a dummy variable
(Missing) to identify observations with this correction. But probit regressions (not reported) indicate that these
observations are not random — they are more likely to involve patents with low value and in areas where ownership
is not concentrated. As additional robustness check, we restricted the sample to non-missing observations and
re-estimate the baseline speciﬁcation. The results are very similar to those reported in the text.
24ﬂection of transactional complexity that varies across technology ﬁelds, we would expect the
coeﬃcient on fragmentation to be smaller (in absolute value) when we conduct the analysis
at a more detailed level of technology ﬁelds. We check this in column (6), where we replace
the eight technology ﬁeld dummies with the 36 two-digit categories deﬁned by Hall, Jaﬀe and
Trajtenberg (2001). The results are nearly identical to those in our baseline regression.
5 Fragmentation and Total Settlement Delay
We have shown that fragmentation of patent rights reduces the settlement delay per dispute.
In this section we study how fragmentation aﬀects total negotiation delay for a technology user
litigating with n diﬀerent patentees. In our set-up patents are symmetrical in importance and
each court focuses on one infringement only. In addition, because damages are independently
distributed and determined according to the unjust enrichment doctrine, court decisions will
not be aﬀected by the outcome of previous litigations or by the expected outcome of future
disputes. These assumptions imply that each settlement negotiation will have an expected
length equal to E(t∗) and allow us to simplify the exposition avoiding problems of sequential
common-agency.24
To compute total negotiation time, denoted by T, we need assumptions on the timing of
negotiations. If all n negotiations are conducted simultaneously, the expected total bargaining
delay is E(t∗). At the other extreme, the upper bound in total negotiation time is reached when
the downstream user negotiates sequentially with each patentee, in which case the expected
total duration is T = nE(t∗).25 We focus on this case, which represents the maximum delay in
technology diﬀusion predicted by our model.







24A possible way to extend the model is to introduce preliminary injunctions as in Lanjouw and Lerner (2001).
This would change the outside options of our bargaining model and potentially impact on the symmetry of the
outcomes. Another interesting theoretical extension would consider correlated damages.
25This is an upper bound because, following Lerner and Tirole (2004), we assumed that each patent is owned
by a diﬀerent patentee. An intermediate setting would be the case in which the n patents are equally split
among k patentees. In this case if the alleged infringer approaches sequentially the k patentees but negotiates
simultaneously (and independently) for each subset of patents, the expected delay will be equal to kE(t
∗).
25This equation points to a trade-oﬀ that has been overlooked by previous literature on patent
thickets. Ownership fragmentation aﬀects total negotiation time through two channels. The
ﬁrst (positive) term of (10) is the thicket eﬀect. Fragmentation extends total negotiation time
because it increases the number of negotiations in which the infringer has to engage. The
second (negative) term of (10) is the negotiation value eﬀect. Fragmentation reduces the value
at stake in each negotiation and thus the settlement delay per dispute.
These two eﬀects help reconcile the two opposing views on patent thickets in the recent
economic and legal literature — the pro-diﬀusion view of Licthman (2006) and the anti-commons
view of Heller and Eiseberg (1998) and Shapiro (2001). Consider the case where θ is arbitrarily
close to zero, so the required patents are almost perfect complements. In this setting the re-
duction in negotiation time per dispute due to fragmentation, ∂E(t∗)/∂n, is close to zero and
the thicket eﬀect dominates the value eﬀect. This result is consistent with the ‘anti-commons’
view: thickets powerfully increase transaction costs and reduce the speed of technology dif-
fusion. Conversely, Licthman’s conjecture holds when θ is arbitrarily close to n/(n − 1), so
patents are almost perfect substitutes. In this case, the negotiation value per dispute, and thus
the settlement time E(t∗), are arbitrarily small. Then the value eﬀect dominates the thicket
eﬀect, and total delay is reduced.
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1. Unfortunately, we cannot estimate this elasticity because we do not directly observe n. In the
empirical work we used an infringer-speciﬁc index of fragmentation, which depends on the total
number of patents across diﬀerent technology classes. Thus we need to translate the elasticity
condition in terms of the fragmentation index.
To simplify the analysis we assume that the user obtains all his inputs from a represen-
tative technology class. Then the Fragmentation1 index is simply f(N) = 1 −
k(N)
N = 1 − C4
where k(N) denotes the number of patents held by the top four patentees in the class and N
the total number of patents in the class. Let εtf be the elasticity of per-dispute litigation time
respect to f(N) and εkN denote the elasticity of k(N) with respect to N. Using the fact that
total negotiation time is E(T) = nE(t∗(f(N))), after some manipulation, we can show that the









where εnN is the elasticity of the number of negotiations, n, with respect to N.26 Condition
(11) requires that the (negative) impact of fragmentation on dispute duration is large enough
and that εnN and εkN are not too large.27
We use our estimates of εtf for the pre- and post-CAFC sub-periods (-1.7 and -0.4,
respectively) and the observed value of C4 to evaluate whether condition (11) holds. Since we
found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the fragmentation coeﬃcient across technology areas (Section
4.2), we use a single value for εtf. To do this computation, we need to measure the impact of
an increase in the number of patents on the portfolios of the top four patentees, εkN, and on
the number of infringer negotiations, εnN. We compute εkN as the growth rate of the stock of
patents held by the top four patentees divided by the growth rate of the total stock of patents,
averaged over the entire sample period for a given technology ﬁeld. We compute εnN as the
average growth rate of the number of patent suits per assignee divided by the growth rate of
the patent stock.28 In doing this, we use the full NBER data set on patenting (not only patents
in our litigated sample).
Table 6 summarizes the input and results of the calculations.29 For a regime without
CAFC, the condition is satisﬁed for two technology areas, Other Health and Chemicals. Here
the pro-diﬀusion eﬀect of fragmentation dominates the anti-diﬀusion eﬀect of the increase in
disputes, so total negotiation time declines. In the other technology areas, however, fragmenta-
26In this derivation we think of n, the number of patent holders with whom a technology user needs to bargain,
as a (monotonic) function of the total number of patents, N.
27The condition is valid provided that εkN ≤ 1. If εkN > 1, an increase in patenting is associated with an
increase in the share of the top four patentees, and thus a reduction in our measure of fragmentation. In this case,
settlement delay per dispute would rise, so the increase in patenting would necessarily raise total negotiation
delay, T = nE(t
∗).
28We adjust for the substantial under-reporting of patent suits in the court data, using the estimates provided
by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001b), Appendix 1.
29It should be noted that over the sample period we observe a decline in the C4 measure — hence a rise in
fragmentation — in four of the six technology areas: Biotechnology (0.12 to 0.07), Electronics (0.11 to 0.09),
Chemicals (0.07 to 0.06), Pharmaceuticals (0.14 to 0.08) and Other Health (from 0.10 to 0.06). In the other
two ﬁelds — Mechanical and Miscellaneous — fragmentation as we measure it actually declined, so there is no
scope for changes in fragmentation to have reduced settlement delay. Thus we do not include these two areas in
the table.
27tion is associated with a rise in total negotiation time. The key factor that makes the diﬀerence
is the extent to which the number of disputes per assignee increased as patenting rose (εnN).
By contrast, in a regime with CAFC the anti-diﬀusion eﬀect of fragmentation dominates in all
technology areas, reﬂecting the fact that CAFC substantially reduced the pro-diﬀusion eﬀect
of fragmentation.
These calculations are only illustrative and should not be over-interpreted. Still, they
suggest that the anti-commons view of Heller and Eisenberg (2001) may be too pessimistic,
at least for some technology areas. Moreover, we emphasize that this analysis has focused on
the case of sequential negotiations. At the other extreme, when negotiations are conducted
simultaneously, total negotiation time is simply E(t∗(n)) and it immediately follows that frag-
mentation reduces total negotiation time because it reduces delay per dispute. Thus the impact
of patent thickets depends crucially on the timing of licensing negotiations.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how fragmentation of patent rights (‘patent thickets’) and the formation
of the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) aﬀected the duration of patent disputes,
and thus the speed of technology diﬀusion through licensing. We develop a model of patent
litigation which predicts that settlement agreements are reached more quickly in the presence
of fragmented patent rights and when there is less uncertainty about court outcomes as was
the case after the introduction of the ‘pro-patent’ CAFC. The model helps to reconcile two
opposite views of patent thickets in recent economic and legal literature: the pro-diﬀusion view
of Licthman (2006) and the anti-commons view of Heller and Eiseberg (1998) and Shapiro
(2001). We test the predictions of the model using a dataset that covers nearly all patent suits
in U.S. federal district courts during the period 1975-2000.
There are two main empirical ﬁndings. First, patent disputes in U.S. district courts are
settled more quickly when infringers require access to fragmented external rights, but this eﬀect
is much weaker after the introduction of CAFC. Second, the introduction of CAFC is associated
with a direct and large reduction on the duration of disputes, which the model attributes to
less uncertainty about the outcome if the dispute goes to trial. In addition, our calculations
suggest that fragmentation may have reduced total negotiation delay, and thus sped up rather
28than retarded technology diﬀusion, in some technology areas during the period before CAFC.
There are several useful directions for further research. The ﬁrst is to extend the bar-
gaining framework to multiple players to study externalities in the litigation process and the
determinants of settlement with multi-lateral bargaining. Second, it would be worthwhile to
investigate more fully how ﬁrm characteristics, including the size and liquidity position of dis-
putants, aﬀects the duration of disputes. Finally, survey evidence on the actual timing and
structure of negotiations between downstream users and upstream patent-holders would be
extremely useful in assessing the impact of patent thickets on technology diﬀusion.
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33Appendix 1. Generalization of the Bargaining Game
In this Appendix we introduce both a longer time horizon to the bargaining game and a
richer class of payoﬀ functions. Following Spier (1992) we assume that there are T periods of
bargaining prior to the court judgment which takes place in period T + 1. In each period t
the patentee makes a settlement oﬀer to the infringer which either accepts or rejects it. If the
infringer rejects, the bargaining game continues with the patentee making another settlement
oﬀer in the following period. The case proceeds to trial if the litigants cannot agree before time
T. If the infringer is found liable, the court will award a judgement z(n,θ,V ) to the patentee.
We allow now for a general damage function z(n,θ,V ) that satisﬁes ∂z/∂n ≤ 0 and ∂z/∂θ ≤ 0.
As in Spier (1992), we assume a discount factor equal to δ and impose the following technical
assumption:
Assumption A1: The defendants’ strategies are such that if type p￿ accepts settlement
oﬀer St with positive probability, then all types p￿￿ > p￿ accept St with probability 1.
Under Assumption A1, the distribution of infringer types that remains in each period
is a truncation of the original uniform distribution. Exploiting these truncated distribution,
it is straightforward to compute the probability of settlement for each t = 1,...,T + 1 and
the corresponding expected settlement time E(t∗). Proposition A1 shows that the results of
Proposition 1 can be generalized to this new setting.
Proposition A1 The expected settlement time E(t∗) is weakly decreasing in n and θ.
P roof. From Spier (1992) we know that the distribution of types remaining at the
beginning of period t is uniform on [0,pt] where p1 = 1 in our model. In addition:













































Appendix 2. Generalization of the CAFC Eﬀect
In this section, we extend the two period model adopting a more general family of distribution
functions G(p,m) = pm with m ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. For each m the mean of G(p,m) is
m(m+1)−1 and the variance is m(m+2)−1(m+1)−2. Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
we use this family of distribution functions to investigate the impact of a ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance shift in the distribution of the probability of the patentee prevailing at trial. In
fact, distributions with larger values of m have higher mean and lower variance, and ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominate those with lower values of m.
As in the case with uniform distribution, fragmentation (large n) tends to reduce bar-
gaining delay whereas complementarity (low θ) increases the expected settlement time per
dispute.30
Proposition A2 The expected settlement time, E(t∗), is non-increasing in n and θ.
P roof. The ﬁrst order condition becomes:
mpm−1




For each m (12) has a unique solution that we denote p(m) with corresponding expected
settlement time E(t∗) = G(p(m),m). Because the left hand side of the ﬁrst order condition is
increasing in p we have that
dp
dz
> 0. In addition, because
dz
dn











30The comparative statics in fragmentation and complementarity are valid for all distribution functions, G(p),




≤ 0 it follows that E(t∗) is non-increasing in θ.
Thus far, the impact of CAFC has been modeled as a shift in the distribution of p with a
fraction of courts awarding damages with probability one. Exploiting the class of distribution
functions G(p,m) we can study the impact of the Centralized Appellate Court considering more
general ﬁrst order stochastic dominance shifts. Speciﬁcally, we model CAFC as an increase in
m leading to a new distribution with higher mean (pro-patent bias) and lower variance (greater
predictability). The next proposition shows that if legal costs are not too large an increase in






1 − e−1 ￿ 1.582 an increase in m leads to a reduction in
expected settlement time.
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. Notice that (13) is negative as long as logp > −1 that requires
p(m) > 1/e. We will now show that p(m) ≥ 1/e implies p(m￿) ≥ 1/e for each m￿ ≥ m. To
see this notice that the left hand side of the ﬁrst order condition is increasing in p. Therefore














Because φ￿(m) < 0 it follows that φ(m￿) < z/L and p(m￿) ≥ 1/e. This result implies that













The previous proposition shows that CAFC reduces settlement time if the ratio between
legal fees and size of the case is not too large. The threshold on the ratio z/L is consistent
with previous theoretical work on patent litigation (e.g., Lanjouw and Lerner, 1998). This
36generalization points out that CAFC has two opposite eﬀects on litigants’ incentive to settle.
On one hand, it reduces uncertainty (variance) of outcomes and this facilitates settlement
agreement. On the other hand, it increases the expected damages which increasing the appeal
of litigation. Thus disputes that were too expensive to litigate before CAFC may become
proﬁtable to do so after CAFC and this explains why a condition on z/L is required. The same
proposition also shows that the reduction in settlement time is larger for circuits where court
decisions have larger variance. It is these circuits for which CAFC represents a larger increase
in m.
Finally, the following proposition shows that in this generalized setting the interplay of




can be positive or negative.







































= pm−1 (1 + mlog(p)) ≶ 0
it is easy to see that the sign of the cross-derivative
d2E(t∗)
dndm
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Mean Median  Std. Dev.  Min Max
Dispute Duration (Months) 18.60 12 20.48 0 172
Fragmentation1 0.89 0.91 0.07 0.45 0.99
Fragmentation2 0.95 0.98 0.11 0 1
Complementarity x10
3 0.27 0.01 3.52 0 110.32
Value 18.80 11 25.29 0 327
Age of Patent 7.76 6 5.37 0 20
Table 1.  Descriptive StatisticsDispute Duration
Entire Period (1975-2000)
Before CAFC (1975-81)













< 50th Percentile > 50th Percentile
Table 2. Fragmentation, Complementarity and Dispute Duration










15.91975-2000 Before CAFC After CAFC
Entire Sample 7.06 17.19 5.95
Drugs 6.47 22.22 5.59
Other Health 11.39 25.93 10.33
Chemicals 7.61 19.54 5.75
Electronics 4.38 13.10 3.55
Computers 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mechanical 7.80 20.53 6.24
Biotech 6.90 33.33 3.85
Others 6.73 6.33 6.77
Table 3. Impact of CAFC on Frequency of District Court Adjudications 




Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient  Marg. Effect Coefficient  Marg. Effect Coefficient  Marg. Effect Coefficient  Marg. Effect
Fragmentation1 0.556*** -10.336 0.719*** -13.366 0.567*** -10.601 1.845*** -55.368 1.606*** -48.196 1.460** -43.815
(0.179) (0.181) (0.192) (0.628) (0.598) (0.607)
Complementarity x 10
5
-1.161*** 21.582 -1.050*** 19.519 -0.922*** 17.140 -0.887*** 16.489 -0.904*** 16.805 -0.934*** 17.363
(0.102) (0.127) (0.114) (0.108) (0.115) (0.098)
CAFC 0.293*** -6.008 0.297*** -6.001 0.268*** -5.293 1.563*** -50.714 1.281** -43.150 1.278** -41.266
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.588) (0.564) (0.572)
CAFC x Fragmentation1 -1.432** 48.207 -1.199* 41.139 -1.188* 39.099
(0.647) (0.619) (0.628)
High Variance -0.169* 3.771
(0.096)




-0.165*** 3.067 -0.174*** 3.235 -0.177*** 3.291 -0.172*** 3.197
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Duplicates -0.556*** 12.910 -0.557*** 12.933 -0.563*** 13.105 -0.586*** 14.006
(0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.069)
Missing 0.062** -1.093 0.064** -1.125 0.064** -1.141 0.060** -1.081
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Tech Field Dummies YES*** YES* YES* YES* YES* YES*
District Court Dummies YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** NO
Year Dummies (1992-2000) YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES***
Observations 4489 4489 4489 4489 4489 4489 4489
(6)
NOTES: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance: *10%,  **5%, ***1%.  Coefficients, standard errors and marginal effects for complementarity and value are multiplied by 100.  Coefficients are from proportional hazard 
regressions.
Table 4. Baseline Specification - Dependent Variable: Dispute Duration
(4) (2) (3) (1) (5)Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient  Marg. Effect Coefficient  Marg. Effect
Fragmentation1 1.900*** -57.019 1.814*** -54.438 1.791*** -53.748 1.831*** -54.948 1.746*** -52.397





-1.181*** 21.955 -0.885*** 16.452 -1.136*** 21.119 -0.808*** 15.021 -0.917*** 17.047 -0.861*** 16.006
(0.199) (0.109) (0.157) (0.119) (0.109) (0.162)
CAFC 1.603*** -52.159 1.544*** -50.021 1.530*** -49.656 1.516** -55.941 0.882*** -25.501 1.494*** -47.223
(0.587) (0.590) (0.585) (0.594) (0.263) (0.570)
CAFC x Fragmentation1 -1.491** 49.927 -1.411** 47.450 -1.399** 46.951 -1.375** 47.041 -1.340** 45.397
(0.647) (0.649) (0.644) (0.654) (0.629)




-0.294*** 5.645 -0.175*** 3.253 -0.168*** 3.123 -0.220*** 4.090 -0.169*** 3.141 -0.195*** 3. 625





Serial Patentees -0.200* 3.856
(0.119)
Serial Infringers 0.214* -3.459
(0.122)
Large Portfolios 0.289** -4.451
(0.139)
Small Portfolios 0.076** -1.329
(0.033)
Detailed Field dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES***
Observations 4489 4489 4489 3402 4489 4489
(6)
NOTES: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional controls (not reported) are: missing, duplicates, tech field dummies, court dummies  and year dummies for the period 92-00.  Statistical significance: *10%, **5%, *** 1%.  Cases litigated after 
1993 are dropped in column (4).  Coefficients, standard errors and marginal effects for complementarity and value are multiplied by 100.
Table 5. Extensions and Robustness - Dependent Variable: Dispute Duration
(5) (3) (4) (1) (2) 
 
                         
                    
 
enN ekN C4
Without CAFC With CAFC
DRUGS 0.29 0.30 0.10 -0.46 -0.11
OTHER HEALTH 0.05 0.45 0.07 -1.41 -0.33
CHEMICALS 0.05 0.15 0.06 -1.84 -0.43
BIOTECH 0.13 0.28 0.08 -0.82 -0.19
ELECTRONICS 0.26 0.14 0.10 -0.53 -0.14
etn
Table 6. Impact of Fragmentation on Total Negotiation Time
Notation: e nN =  elasticity of negotiations respect to patents granted, e kN =  elasticity of the size of four largest portfolios respect 
to patents granted, C4 = average share of top patentees in the period, e tn =  elasticity of negotiation time respect to number of 
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